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Abstract	
	As	communication	technology	has	grown,	so	has	the	potential	for	crimes	to	be	committed	with	the	new	technology.	The	United	States	government	has	attempted	to	stay	current	with	the	times	by	introducing	legislation	to	increase	federal	power	to	detect	and	stop	these	crimes,	but	some	feel	that	some	of	these	new	laws	and	acts	reduce	personal	freedoms	and	liberties.	Enter	Tor	and	the	Dark	Web,	a	set	of	often	misunderstood	tools	and	web-based	resources	designed	to	make	users’	data	and	behavior	on	the	Internet	anonymous.	This	paper	describes	the	aforementioned	laws,	how	Tor	and	the	Dark	Web	work,	and	examines	how	attitudes	towards	privacy	impact	knowledge	and	attitudes	towards	the	Dark	Web	and	Tor.		 	
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		 			 INTRODUCTION		In	recent	years,	news	headlines	seem	like	they	are	ripped	straight	from	science	fiction	novels.	Many	believe	that	George	Orwell’s	predictions	in	1984	have	come	true,	that	Big	Brother	is	truly	watching	us	all.	One	can	prattle	off	names	of	hot	button	issues	involving	the	government	harvesting	private	citizens’	data:	Eric	Snowden’s	leaks,	the	National	Security	Administration,	Tor	and	the	“deep	web.”	Software	manufacturers	are	told	by	the	government	to	put	backdoors	into	their	programs	that	allow	easy	access	to	data.	As	cliché	as	it	is,	every	citizen	is	slowly	becoming	their	own	Winston	Smith,	whether	they	know	it	or	not.	What	sounds	like	the	ravings	of	a	tinfoil	hat	wearing	man	on	a	street	corner	has	suddenly	become	the	featured	story	on	the	nightly	news.		 To	what	end	is	the	government	collecting	data	on	its	citizens?	The	argument	is	that	it	keeps	us	safe.	With	this	data,	the	NSA	will	be	able	to	stop	crimes	before	they	happen	or	catch	terrorists	in	the	act	just	by	the	search	terms	they	enter	on	Google.	Maybe	they	are	right.	Maybe	it	is	completely	possible	to	justify	the	(up	until	recently)	secretive	databases	of	previously	encrypted	data	acquired	through	surveillance	systems	like	PRISM	or	by	implanting	malware	into	phones	to	collect	text	messages.		
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	 This	makes	sense	to	some;	the	innocent	have	nothing	to	hide,	and,	even	though	their	data	is	being	mined,	what	real	harm	is	there	in	the	government	seeing	a	few	work	e-mails	or	a	few	quick	texts	to	invite	friends	out	for	drinks?	Some	are	willing	to	sacrifice	their	personal	freedom	in	order	to	gain	a	sense	of	safety.	Yes,	there	is	the	old	adage	about	those	willing	to	give	up	privacy	for	freedom	deserving	neither,	but	this	is	a	different	time.	We	live	in	an	age	where	enemies	of	freedom,	both	from	the	United	States	and	outside	of	it,	can	communicate	with	incredible	ease	and	carry	out	acts	of	cyber	terrorism	in	the	blink	of	an	eye.		This	begs	the	question:	should	there	be	information	that	the	government	cannot	access	through	subpoena?	Furthermore,	do	citizens	have	the	innate	right	to	privacy	for	all	of	their	data?		Do	citizens	truly	care	about	their	right	to	privacy	enough	to	seek	out	methods	to	circumvent	or	escape	government	surveillance?	To	answer	this	question,	we	must	look	at	the	laws	in	place	regarding	information	privacy,	the	surveillance	technology	the	government	is	using	to	gather	data,	and		theencryption	technologies	that	are	used	to	secure	data.			 	
	 8	
		 REVIEW	OF	LITERATURE		The	Omnibus	Crime	Control	and	Safe	Streets	Act	of	1968			 According	to	the	2013	U.S.	census,	between	73%	to	84%	of	American	homes	have	a	computer	in	their	homes	with	Internet	access	(Raine	and	D’Vera).	The	United	States	is	a	nation	of	“plugged	in”	people,	with	gigabytes	upon	gigabytes	of	data	being	transmitted	every	day,	whether	it	is	through	home	computers,	public	computers,	work	computers,	or	smartphones.	The	Internet	has	changed	the	way	people	communicate,	both	in	person	and	across	long	distances,	but	beyond	that,	it	has	become	a	part	of	almost	every	facet	of	an	average	citizen’s	life.	The	normal	morning	paper	and	coffee	routine	has	been	replaced	by	checking	e-mails	and	reading	news	site	headlines.		Text	messages	seem	to	have	replaced	the	need	for	actual,	physical	conversation.	Purchases	are	made	every	day	over	the	Internet,	whether	they	are	for	consumer	or	business	purposes.	Current	society	is	truly	the	best	argument	for	the	Singularity	becoming	a	reality.			 It	follows	that,	with	such	sensitive	information	floating	out	in	cyberspace,	the	government	may	feel	the	need	to	protect	their	own	interests	and	the	safety	of	citizens	by	regulating	communication.	Although	there	are	many	laws	governing	communications,	The	Omnibus	Crime	Control	and	Safe	Streets	Act	of	1968,	specifically	Title	III	regarding	wiretaps,	laid	the	basic	framework	for	government	power	in	acquiring	citizen’s	private	communications.	The	act	stated	that	the	nothing	
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contained	within	the	document	itself,	nor	previous	laws,	would	limit	the	president’s	power	to	“protect	the	nation	from	actual	or	potential	attack	or	other	hostile	acts	of	a	foreign	power,	to	obtain	foreign	intelligence	information	deemed	essential	to	the	security	of	the	United	States,	or	to	protect	national	security	information	against	foreign	intelligence	activities”	(U.S.	Select	Committee	to	Study	Government	Operations	289).	At	this	point,	while	the	president’s	power	seemed	virtually	unlimited	to	tap	wires	without	a	warrant,	the	laws	were	structured	around	protecting	the	United	States	from	foreign	attack	and	only	foreign	attack.	The	act	simply	states	that	these	powers	do	exist,	but	does	not	truly	define	them	in	any	way.			 	Before	Title	III,	wiretaps	(whether	under	warrant	or	not)	were	a	gray	area	in	the	eyes	of	the	Fourth	Amendment,	which	protects	citizens	from	unlawful	search	and	seizure	of	property.	Since	there	is	no	physical	invasion	in	a	wiretap,	the	definition	of	“search”	in	the	Fourth	Amendment	was	contested,	and	in	1928,	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	allowed	wiretaps	for	suspected	bootleggers	because	the	Fourth	Amendment	“did	not	apply	unless	the	G-men	physically	invaded	the	defendant’s	premises”	(Swire	12).	By	1968,	times	had	changed,	and	a	further	Supreme	Court	case	ruled	that	any	attempt	to	search,	including	wiretaps,	would	have	to	meet	the	Fourth	Amendment	standards	before	being	legal.	Title	III	was	an	attempt	to	codify	that	sentiment	into	law.	The	Fourth	Amendment	requires	that	searches	be	reasonable,	defined	as	“balancing	the	degree	of	intrusion	against	the	need	for	it”	(Swire	13).	While	Title	III	is	large	in	scope,	it	only	allows	warrantless	wiretaps	in	situations	that	involve	a	foreign	power	or	protecting	the	government	from	being	completely	overthrown.	Again,	there	is	no	discussion	of	exactly	what	
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these	powers	entail,	but	just	a	broad	statement	that	they	do	exist.	At	the	time,	small	acts	of	domestic	terrorism	seemed	negligible	in	the	eyes	of	this	law.		The	Foreign	Intelligence	Surveillance	Act	of	1978			 The	next	large-scale	piece	of	legislation	to	deal	with	information	privacy	was	the	Foreign	Intelligence	Surveillance	Act	of	1978	(FISA).		As	the	name	implies,	the	act	focused	on	foreign	intelligence.	The	FISA	helped	define	exactly	what	a		“foreign	power”	is,	specifically	that	the	definition	now	included	a	foreign	government	not	recognized	by	the	United	States,	“factions	of	a	foreign	nation”,	or	“a	group	engaged	in	international	terrorism	or	activities	in	preparation	therefor,”	as	per	section	1801.		The	aforementioned	foreign	powers	“certainly	included	the	Communist	states	arrayed	against	the	United	States	in	the	Cold	War”	and	were	specifically	worded	to	target	satellite	nations	of	the	USSR,	according	to	cyberlaw	expert	Peter	Swire	(24).		The	FISA	drew	distinct	lines	between	United	States-persons	and	non-United	States	persons,	but	was	not	so	clear-cut	on	who	could	be	watched.	All	agents	of	a	foreign	power	could	be	targets	of	surveillance	and	the	criteria	was	as	simple	as	being	an	employee	of	a	non-United	States	nation.	United	States	citizens	could	only	be	declared	an	agent	of	a	foreign	power	if	they	were	“knowingly	engaged	in	a	listed	activity,	such	as	clandestine	intelligence	activities	for	a	foreign	power”	(Swire	25).	This	definition	fed	off	of	Cold	War	panic	and	allowed	KGB	agents	(or	suspected	agents)	acting	domestically	to	be	spied	on	even	if	they	were	technically	living	in	the	United	States.		
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	 One	large	change	from	Title	III	to	FISA	was	that,	under	Title	III,	targets	of	surveillance	would	be	notified	after	they	had	been	spied	on	that	information	had	been	taken.	The	FISA,	however,	was	“cloaked	in	secrecy,”	only	notifying	the	target	when	the	evidence	was	used	in	court	against	them	but	not	even	guaranteeing	them	the	right	to	see	what	that	evidence	was	(Swire	28).		The	FISA	allowed	the	President,	through	the	Attorney	General,	to	authorize	electronic	surveillance	without	a	court	order	for	up	to	a	year	on	communications	used	by	the	foreign	powers.	The	FISA	also	created	a	Foreign	Intelligence	Surveillance	Court	to	grant	orders	for	surveillance	on	foreign	powers,	effectively	creating	a	checks	and	balances	system.		In	addition,	the	Attorney	General	was	required	to	report	to	the	House	and	Senate	Intelligence	Comities	every	six	months	and	yearly	to	the	general	public	about	the	total	number	of	applications	for	wiretaps	and	the	number	that	were	actually	approved.			 However,	wiretaps	could	still	be	granted	on	United	States	citizens	through	a	court	order,	pursuant	to	section	1805,	which	requires	that	the	court	find	“probable	cause”	that	the	surveyed	individual	or	individuals	are	a	foreign	power	or	an	agent	of	a	foreign	power.		Furthermore,	they	must	also	adhere	to	“minimization	procedures,”	which,	according	to	Section	1801(h)(1)	are	designed	to	reduce	dissemination,	acquisition,	and	retention	of	material	collected	from	United	States	citizens.			 While	the	FISA	did	regulate	wiretaps	with	bureaucratic	pressure,	it	also	dismissed	the	Fourth	Amendment	right	to	be	notified	of	any	seizure	of	property	in	the	case	of	a	wiretap.	It	also	legitimized	secret	wiretaps,	even	going	so	far	as	to	provide	a	path	to	legally	approve	them.	The	laws,	while	seemingly	open	ended,	still	
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required	that	investigations’	primary	purpose	be	gaining	intelligence	on	foreign	powers.			The	USA	PATRIOT	Act	
 	 After	the	tragic	terrorist	attack	that	took	place	on	September	11th,	2001,	the	next	large	privacy	legislation,	the	USA	PATRIOT	Act	(PATRIOT	Act)	was	set	into	law.	The	Act	was	designed	to	both	provide	preventative	measures	against	future	terrorism	attacks	and	bring	information	privacy	laws	up	to	date	with	the	increasing	amount	of	Internet	access	and	telecommunication	in	the	United	States.	The	PATRIOT	Act,	specifically	Titles	II,	VII,	and	IX,	dealt	with	how	information	could	be	collected	and	the	reasons	why	it	could	be	collected.	As	stated	above,	the	FISA	required	orders	for	wiretaps	to	certify	that	“the	purpose	of	the	surveillance	is	to	obtain	foreign	intelligence	information”	(Swire	39).	The	PATRIOT	Act	changed	this	to	just	a	“significant”	purpose,	meaning	that	the	surveillance	did	not	have	to	explicitly	look	into	foreign	communication.	The	change,	while	small,	highlighted	the	paradigm	shift	after	the	events	of	September	11th.	“Terrorism,”	as	a	whole,	was	more	broadly	looked	at	when	determining	threats	to	American	life,	not	just	large-scale	foreign	espionage.	While	Title	18	of	US	Code	already	defined	domestic	and	international	terrorism,	the	PATRIOT	Act	broadened	these	terms,	adding	assassination,	mass	destruction,	and	kidnapping	to	both	forms.		Some	politicians,	such	as	congresswoman	Tammy	Baldwin,	have	expressed	outrage	over	the	expansion	of	the	definition	of	terrorism,	deeming	the	definition	too	expansive	and	
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implying	that	it	could	make	American	citizens	who	display	their	dissent	in	a	peaceful	manner	out	to	be	terrorists	(Moore,	Fahrenheit	9/11).	Particularly	important	to	information	privacy	is	section	814,	which	redefined	terms	dealing	with	cyberterrorism,	creating	laws	that	could	label	those	that	commit	computer	crimes	as	terrorists.	According	to	Ellen	Podgor	of	the	American	Bar’s	
Criminal	Justice	Magazine,	computer	damage	can	only	be	claimed	as	a	terroristic	act	if	the	action	“be	knowingly	committed	and	the	damage	intentional.”			 Title	II	is	where	these	definitions	start	to	take	effect.	Entitled	“Enhanced	surveillance	procedures,”	the	section	greatly	enhances	the	power	to	intercept	communications	(oral,	wire,	and	electronic)	relating	to	terrorism	and	computer	fraud.	While	other	acts	attempted	to	limit	the	scope	of	whom	the	surveillance	could	target,	the	PATRIOT	Act,	born	from	post-9/11	fear,	broadened	the	spectrum	of	terrorism	and	thus	widened	the	scope	of	how	much	and	what	kind	of	information	could	be	intercepted.	One	large,	sweeping	motion	is	found	in	Section	215,	which	changes	FISA	laws	from	focusing	just	on	electronic	communications	to	any	“tangible”	form	of	intelligence,	including	records,	documents,	and	papers.	According	to	Swire,	this	allowed	FISA	orders	to	supersede	previous	laws	and	target	information	that	is	“generally	subject	to	privacy	protections”	(40).		In	addition,	the	FISA	was	amended	so	that	the	orders	only	have	to	prove	that	the	information	is	pertinent	to	an	authorized	investigation,	not	that	the	target	is	a	foreign	power	or	an	agent	of	a	foreign	power.			 While	the	explicit	purpose	of	the	PATRIOT	Act	seems	to	be	combating	terrorism,	this	change	allows	anyone	to	be	subject	to	a	FISA	order	as	long	as	it	can	
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be	reasonably	argued	that	the	information	gathered	is	relevant	to	an	investigation.	There	are	virtually	no	limits	to	the	type	or	amount	of	data	gathered.	Section	206	goes	even	further	by	providing	a	legal	path	for	“roving”	wiretaps.	Previously,	FISA	acts	were	tied	to	a	specific	telephone,	but,	to	adapt	to	changing	times	and	new	technology	like	cell	phones,	the	PATRIOT	Act	allowed	wiretap	requests	to	be	tied	to	an	individual	person	instead.		Section	212,	titled	“Emergency	disclosure	of	communications	to	protect	life	and	limb,”	details	when	a	communications	provider	can	disclose	information	about	a	customer’s	communications.	Previously,	providers	could	never	do	this,	but	now	if	they	“reasonably”	believe	that	death	or	injury	is	imminent,	they	can	do	so	to	an	investigative	agency.	In	addition,	when	a	government	agency	has	a	court	order	for	this	information,	they	must	disclose	it.	This,	in	tandem	with	section	213,	which	allows	the	notification	of	search	warrants	to	be	delayed,	presents	a	government	with	access	to	both	consumer	and	personal	information	without	having	to	tell	targets	when	they	are	being	searched.			 While	the	FISA	orders	may	have	been	gathered	in	secret,	the	FISA	included	a	clause	that	allowed	some	of	the	targets	to	be	notified	that	they	were	being	spied	upon.	The	PATRIOT	Act	gets	around	this	with	Section	215,	one	clause	of	which	states	“no	person	shall	disclose	to	any	other	person	(other	than	those	persons	necessary	to	produce	the	tangible	things	under	this	section)	that	the	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation	has	sought	or	obtained	tangible	things.”		When	taking	the	law	literally	at	its	word,	the	FBI	can	target	anyone	for	surveillance,	for	virtually	any	reason,	and	obtain	any	amount	of	any	information	they	want.		
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	 Strangely	enough,	in	a	scene	from	director	Michael	Moore’s	controversial	documentary	Fahrenheit	9/11,	a	news	clip	from	small	town	America	has	citizens	extolling	the	virtues	of	the	PATRIOT	Act,	calling	it	“a	good	thing”	and	something	“that	needed	to	be	done.”	In	a	fit	of	Cold	War-esque	paranoia,	working	class	American	citizens	from	all	over	the	country	had	started	to	become	suspicious	of	terrorist	activity.	The	definition	had	expanded	so	much	that	anything	could	become	a	target	for	terrorists	and	anyone	could	be	a	terrorist.	One	man	lived	out	a	textbook	Orwellian	experience	after	being	turned	into	the	FBI	by	his	friends	because	he	spoke	out	against	the	War	on	Terror.			 One	major	safety	provision	of	the	PATRIOT	Act	is	that	is	still	allows	the	protections	offered	by	the	First	Amendment	(freedom	of	the	press,	speech,	assembly,	religion,	etc.)	to	remain	untouched.	Section	214,	“Pen	register	and	trap	and	trace	authority,”	expressly	forbids	investigations	from	violating	the	first	amendment.	However,	it	also	lays	out	guidelines	for	electronic	surveillance	on	anyone	suspected	of	terroristic	activities.	According	to	congressman	John	Conyers,	“there	had	to	be	a	surrendering	of	certain		[…]	rights”	in	order	for	citizens	to	feel	safe	from	terrorism	(Moore,	Fahrenheit	9/11).				Homeland	Security	Act			 A	little	over	a	year	after	the	PATRIOT	Act	was	passed,	Congress	felt	that	some	of	the	new	powers	given	to	the	government	were	a	bit	too	broad	in	scope.	Thus,	the	following	year,	the	Homeland	Security	Act	of	2002	(HSA)	was	passed.	According	to	
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President	George	W.	Bush,	the	purpose	of	the	HSA	was	to	“defend	the	United	States	and	protect	citizens	from	the	dangers	of	a	new	era”	(Kirkpatrick	and	Lockhart	LLP	1).		The	HSA	is	most	known	for	creating	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security,	but	Title	II	of	the	Act,	“Information	Analysis	and	Infrastructure	Protection,”	deals	directly	with	cyberterrorism	and	information	security.	This	title	is	divided	into	four	subtitles:	Subtitle	A	–	Directorate	for	Information	Analysis	and	Infrastructure	Protection;	Access	to	Information,	Subtitle	B	–	Critical	Infrastructure	Information,	Subtitle	C	–	Information	Security,	and	Subtitle	D	-	Office	of	Science	and	Technology.				 Subtitle	A	created	an	Under	Secretary	for	Information	Analysis	and	Infrastructure	Protection	who	is	responsible	for	analyzing	law	enforcement	and	intelligence	information	to	detect	potential	acts	of	terrorism	against	the	United	States.	The	Under	Secretary	must	also	develop	a	plan	for	“securing	the	key	resources	and	critical	infrastructure	of	the	United	States,”	which,	as	defined	in	this	law,	includes	information	technology	and	satellite	systems,	effectively	giving	the	Under	Secretary	power	over	these	areas.	The	Under	Secretary	can	also	develop	policies	and	procedures	designed	to	protect	these	areas	of	interest,	using	data-mining	and	“advanced	analytical	tools”	to	carry	out	these	measures.	According	to	the	Homeland	Security	practice	group	of	Kirkpatrick	&	Lockhart	LLP,	the	Secretary	of	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security	is	“broadly	authorized”	to	gain	information	from	the	private	sector	relating	to	terrorism	or	suspected	terrorist	activities	(2).	The	information	is	broken	down	into	three	broad	categories:	any	assessment	or	analytical	data	regarding	threats	of	terrorism	to	the	United	States,	any	information	
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relating	the	infrastructure	of	the	United	States	to	terrorism,	or	any	unprocessed	data	on	other	subjects	that	relate	to	the	duties	of	the	Secretary.			 Subtitle	B	is	aimed	at	encouraging,	but	not	requiring,	the	private	sector	and	state	and	local	governments	to	share	information	with	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security.	Section	213(3)	defines	critical	infrastructure	information	as	“information	not	customarily	in	the	public	domain	and	related	to	the	security	of	critical	infrastructures	or	protected	systems.”		This	explicitly	includes	any	actual,	threatened,	or	potential	computer	attack	or	misuse	of	electronic	communications	systems.	However,	any	information	voluntarily	submitted	through	this	act	is	not	subject	to	any	type	of	disclosure,	even	if	it	would	fall	under	the	Freedom	of	Information	Act.	As	long	as	the	information	was	knowingly,	voluntarily	submitted	and	the	submitter	knew	ahead	of	time	that	the	information	would	not	be	disclosed,	no	disclosure	is	required.	However,	without	written	consent	from	the	submitter,	the	information	cannot	be	used	directly	in	any	civil	action.	The	information	can	still	be	used	to	start	an	investigation	or	used	to	build	evidence	against	a	suspected	terrorist.			 Subtitle	C	provides	some	limitations	for	the	information	collected	by	Title	II	of	the	HSA.	Section	221	ensures	the	confidentiality	and	security	of	the	information,	as	well	as	limits	unauthorized	redistribution	of	information.	Furthermore,	it	attempts	to	protect	“constitutional	and	statutory	rights”	of	targeted	individuals.	Section	225	creates	another	sub-act	of	sorts	within	the	HSA,	entitled	“Cyber	Security	Enhancement	Act	of	2002.”	While	a	sizable	portion	of	this	act	deals	with	stricter	penalties	for	those	convicted	of	cyber	crimes,	one	of	the	more	interesting	details	is	the	striking	of	Section	212	of	the	PATRIOT	Act,	broadening	it’s	detailed	powers	and	
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allowing	easier	access	to	information.	This	section	changed	the	wording	from	“reasonable	belief”	to	“good	faith	belief”	that	injury	or	death	may	occur,	lowering	the	bar	for	gaining	information	on	telecommunication	providers’	customers.	In	addition,	the	word	“immediate”	was	dropped	and	any	mention	of	an	expiration	date	was	stricken,	making	this	permanent.			 	Even	though	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security	was	established	in	this	act,	the	need	for	a	specific	governing	body	for	new	laws	regarding	computer	crimes	still	remained.	Subtitle	D	established	an	Office	of	Science	and	Technology	within	the	Department	of	Justice,	tasked	with	developing	new	law	enforcement	technology.	This	included	both	physical	weaponry	and	“monitoring	systems	[…]	capable	of	providing	precise	location	information”	and	tools	to	aid	prevention	of	computer	crime.			 Considering	the	great	power	afforded	by	the	PATRIOT	Act	and	the	HSA,	it	seems	that	it	could	be	easy	for	a	government	agency	to	misuse	this	power	and	manipulate	the	law.	The	Electronic	Frontier	Foundation	actually	cites	two	incidents	of	this	happening:	one	where	a	Department	of	Justice	attorney	used	the	pretense	of	a	terrorism	threat	in	order	to	investigate	a	bank	robbery	and	another	where	information	used	to	prevent	a	“bio-terrorism”	threat	was	used	in	a	drug	sting	(“Let	the	Sun	Set	on	PATRIOT:	Section	212	and	Homeland	Security	Act	Section	225:	‘Emergency	Disclosure	of	Electronic	Communications	to	Protect	Life	and	Limb”).	Critics	of	these	laws	feel	that	American	liberties	are	being	stripped	away	in	order	for	citizens	to	feel	freer.	At	what	cost	are	Americans	gaining	a	perceived	sense	of	
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security?	This	is	a	question	critics	have	grappled	with	for	years	as	these	powers	have	expanded	with	each	passing	act	or	law.		 As	shown	in	this	thesis,	the	scope	of	both	who	can	be	targeted	for	unwarranted	surveillance	and	how	much	information	can	be	gleaned	from	that	surveillance	have	increased	greatly.	Each	of	the	major	laws	or	acts	affected	information	privacy	are	a	product	of	their	time,	from	the	FISA’s	concerns	about	American	citizens	working	as	agents	of	Soviet	forces	to	the	PATRIOT	Act’s	obsession	with	broadening	the	definition	of	terrorism	to	a	near	all-encompassing	point.	As	such,	the	laws	are	reactionary	responses	to	the	perceived	threats	against	the	structure	of	United	States	way	of	life.	They	are	not	so	much	preventative	measures	to	determine	who	will	become	a	threat	and	combat	it	ahead	of	time,	as	they	are	ways	of	increasing	government	power	by	using	fear	as	a	catalyst.	This	begs	the	question:	how	far	is	too	far?	Where	is	the	line	between	the	citizens’	right	private	information	and	the	government’s	need	to	have	it?		Tor	and	the	Dark	Web			 Some	feel	that	there	should	be	information	on	the	Internet	that	cannot	be	peered	into	through	normal	means.	Those	wanting	to	escape	from	the	all-seeing	eyes	of	big	brother	have	created	Internet	sites	based	around	keeping	their	information	anonymous.	These	sites,	collectively	known	as	the	Dark	Web,	are	defined	by	BrightPlanet	(a	website	that	collects	content	and	resources	about	the	Dark	Web)	as	a	portion	of	websites	“that	have	been	intentionally	hidden	and	[are]	
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inaccessible	through	standard	web	browsers.”	They	make	up	a	small	portion	of	the	Deep	Web,	which	is	further	defined	as	“anything	a	search	engine	can’t	find”	(“Clearing	Up	Confusion	–	Deep	Web	Vs.	Dark	Web”).		While	the	Deep	Web	includes	“normal”	websites	used	every	day,	such	as	business’	intranets,	Dark	Web	websites	are	typically	only	accessible	by	using	a	specialized	browser	called	Tor,	and	these	sites	utilize	the	extension	.onion	instead	of	the	ordinary	.com	or	.net.	These	websites,	accordingly,	live	in	the	Tor	network.			 As	expected,	a	fully	functional	“second	internet”	based	in	anonymity	has	its	illicit	uses.	The	most	famous	Dark	Web	website,	Silk	Road,	was	a	marketplace	where	consumers	could	use	Bitcoin	(an	Internet	currency	also	rooted	in	anonymity)	to	purchase	illegal	drugs,	fake	passports,	and	“illegal	services”	such	as	computer	hackers,	according	to	USA	Today	(Leger).	This	is	the	“face”	of	the	Dark	Web	to	the	American	public:	it	is	scary,	illegal,	and	national	newspapers	and	magazines	can	use	it	to	explain	why	having	an	anonymous	Internet	is	a	bad	idea.	When	spun	like	this,	it	seems	like	the	government	wants	to	have	personal	information	solely	to	stop	legitimate	crime	from	happening.	However,	Tor	and	the	Dark	Web	can	be	used	for	far	less	insidious	purposes.		 Tor’s	official	website	defines	the	network	as	“a	group	of	volunteer-operated	servers	that	allows	people	to	improve	their	privacy	and	security	on	the	Internet”	(“Tor:	Overview”).	Tor’s	use	of	outside	servers	means	that	a	user	does	not	have	to	make	a	direct	connection	to	the	website;	their	connection	is	routed	through	a	series	of	hidden	virtual	passages,	guarding	their	identity.	Tor	can	be	used	to	circumvent	censorship	firewalls	or	to	communicate	about	sensitive	information	(such	as	abuse	
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and	rape)	without	giving	any	sort	of	personal	information	about	the	user’s	whereabouts	or	computer.	Moreover,	Tor	can	also	be	used	to	connect	to	and	create	Dark	Web	sites,	which	do	not	give	out	any	location	info	about	the	website.	Since	Tor	is	not	a	public	network,	it	is	not	susceptible	to	“traffic	analysis,”	which	is	the	capability	to	see	who	is	talking	to	who	on	a	public	network	(“Tor:	Overview”).			 When	data	is	sent	over	the	Internet,	it	contains	two	parts:	a	data	payload	and	a	header.	The	payload	contains,	to	put	it	succinctly,	the	“information”	of	the	packet,	such	as	the	text	of	an	e-mail	or	the	content	of	a	video.	The	header	contains	routing	information	and	this	is	the	part	targeted	in	traffic	analysis.		In	layman’s	terms,	as	long	as	someone	can	sit	between	the	sender	and	receiver	of	the	information,	they	can	look	at	the	header	and	see	where	the	information	is	coming	from	and	where	it	is	going.	Tor	routes	the	sent	communication	to	different	points	on	the	Internet,	similar	to	action	movie	villains	that	bounce	illegal	funds	from	hidden	bank	account	to	hidden	bank	account.		In	order	to	achieve	this	and	maintain	a	speed	that	most	users	would	deem	usable,	Tor	must	have	a	large	number	of	nodes.	According	to	Roger	Dingledine,	Nick	Mathewson,	and	Paul	Syverson	of	The	Free	Haven	Project,	this	was	actually	a	goal	in	the	design	choices	of	Tor.	To	achieve	this	capacity,	Tor	must	be	usable,	flexible,	and	simple.	The	authors	argue	that	a	complex	system	will	have	too	few	users,	and	because	“anonymity	systems	hide	users	among	users,	a	system	with	fewer	users	provides	less	anonymity”	(Dingledine,	Mathewson,	and	Syverson).		At	a	certain	point,	due	to	the	mass	of	users	that	Tor	is	able	to	use	to	hide	information,	the	information’s	origin	becomes	nearly	impossible	to	discern.	The	Tor	network	creates	a	private	pathway	by	“incrementally	[building]	a	circuit	of	encrypted	connections	
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through	relays	on	the	network”	with	only	the	current	relay	point	knowing	where	the	information	directly	came	from	(one	step	back)	and	where	the	information	is	going	(one	step	forward)	(“Tor:	Overview”).	The	client	computer	has	a	different	set	of	encryption	keys	than	the	node	computers	do,	so	no	node	ever	has	the	complete	picture.	The	circuits	are	refreshed	over	time,	making	them	even	harder	to	pin	down.			 The	Tor	network	encrypts	the	data	sent	using	Transport	Layer	Security	(TLS)	encryption	(“Tor	FAQ”).	According	to	T.	Dierks	and	E.	Rescorla	of	the	Internet	Engineering	Task	Force,	the	TLS	protocol	allows	clients	to	communicate	with	servers	“in	a	way	that	is	designed	to	prevent	eavesdropping,	tampering,	or	message	forgery.”	The	protocol	consists	of	two	layers:	the	TLS	Record	Protocol	and	the	TLS	Handshake	Protocol.	The	TLS	Record	Protocol	provides	two	basic	functions:	it	guarantees	that	the	connection	is	private	and	that	the	connection	is	reliable.	Symmetric	cryptography	is	used	to	guarantee	privacy;	the	keys	are	generated	separately	for	each	connection	based	on	a	separate	protocol	and	each	set	of	keys	is	unique.	The	TLS	Handshake	protocol	acts	before	“the	application	protocol	transmits	or	receives	its	first	byte	of	data”	and	allows	the	client	and	server	to	negotiate	an	encryption	algorithm	(Dierks	and	Rescorla	4).	The	Handshake	Protocol	provides	a	secure	and	reliable	connection	for	negotiating	the	secret	encryption.	In	addition,	it	also	allows	each	party	to	identify	each	other	using	asymmetric	(public	key)	cryptography	in	order	to	authenticate	that	the	information	is	being	sent	to	the	correct	place.			 Each	node	in	the	Tor	system	has	it’s	own	onion	key,	which	is	a	public	decryption	key	used	to	authenticate	it’s	status	as	a	true	Tor	relay	point	(“Tor	FAQ”).	
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As	the	Tor	client	determines	its	data	path,	it	stops	at	each	relay	point	and	uses	the	key	to	prove	the	authenticity	of	the	node.	Each	relay	also	has	its	own	distinct	identity	key,	which	is	checked	against	the	directory	authority’s	directory	signing	key,	essentially	a	master	list	of	all	known	Tor	relays.	Furthermore,	Tor	sends	data	in	packets	of	512	bytes	each,	no	matter	the	actual	size	of	the	data	being	transmitted,	making	it	hard	to	determine	exactly	how	much	data	is	actually	being	sent.			 At	first	glance,	Tor	seems	like	every	black	market	cliché	come	to	life.	What	criminal	would	not	want	a	virtually	untraceable,	anonymous	way	to	sell	their	wares	and	communicate	about	illicit	activities?	However,	Tor	and	the	Dark	Web	present	a	new	way	for	average	American	citizens	to	communicate	about	sensitive	subjects	without	revealing	their	IP	address	to	prying	eyes.	According	to	the	Tor	Project’s	website,	the	Friends	Service	Committee	and	other	environmental	groups	are	becoming	more	and	more	aware	of	government	surveillance	of	their	activities	(“Tor	Users”).	Their	activities,	while	peaceful,	can	easily	be	construed	as	terrorism	under	the	PATRIOT	Act;	thus	Tor	provides	a	way	to	circumnavigate	the	risk	of	their	personal	information	becoming	exposed.	Furthermore,	government	whistleblowers,	whose	rights	are	being	stripped	away	more	and	more	as	their	information	disseminates	further	to	American	citizens,	can	use	Tor	to	report	their	findings	without	exposing	their	location.	Journalists,	law	enforcement,	bloggers,	and	business	executives	(among	others)	are	all	groups	that	use	Tor	for	legal	purposes	(“Tor	Users”).		 The	Tor	Project’s	FAQ	on	abuse	states	that	only	a	“handful”	of	complaints	have	been	lodged	against	the	service	since	its	creation	in	2003	(“Abuse	FAQ”).	
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Currently,	Tor	is	not	illegal	in	any	part	of	the	world,	and	the	Tor	Project	claims	that	the	service’s	good	parts	outweigh	its	bad	ones	(“Tor	FAQ”).	Tor	has	no	backdoor	in	their	software,	which	would	allow	government	agencies	to	peek	into	the	flow	of	data	despite	its	supposed	anonymity.	The	Tor	Project	says	that	putting	in	a	backdoor	would	be	“tremendously	irresponsible	to	[their]	users,	and	set	a	bad	precedent	for	security	software	in	general”	(“Tor	FAQ”).		Because	of	the	way	data	packets	sent	through	Tor	skip	around	from	computer	to	computer,	Internet	service	providers	(ISPs)	cannot	collect	any	sort	of	information	on	their	customers	that	use	Tor	and	thus	they	cannot	supply	any	information	in	the	event	of	a	subpoena.	All	an	ISP	can	see	is	that	the	user	is	interacting	with	Tor	servers.			 As	stated	before,	Tor	browsers	can	access	special	sites	with	the	top-level	domain	name	.onion,	colloquially	referred	to	as	“onions.”	These	sites	are	part	of	the	Dark	Web,	and	thus	the	Tor	directory	server	must	provide	the	look-up	service	to	get	to	these	websites	(“Tor	FAQ”).	These	websites	function	differently	from	normal	website	in	that	there	is	no	IP	address	associated	with	them	due	to	how	Tor	works.	To	access	the	site,	the	user	must	manually	enter	in	the	long,	complex	strings	of	letters	and	numbers,	followed	by	“.onion.”		While	many	of	these	onions	are	used	for	illegal	purposes	(such	as	the	aforementioned	Silk	Road),	others	are	used	for	less	insidious	purposes,	such	as	hosting	a	backup	of	government-transparency	website	Wikileaks.	The	interesting	part	about	onions	is	not	the	content	that	they	contain,	but	their	mere	existence	and	the	questions	they	pose.	Onions	allow	information	to	be	stored	on	the	Internet	but	not	stored	in	any	one	location.	While	the	sites	can	be	shut	down	(again,	as	was	the	case	with	Silk	Road)	the	information	is	not	subject	to	the	
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same	rules	that	the	rest	of	the	Internet	must	follow.	Onions	are	a	way	to	build	websites,	and	therefore	an	Internet,	in	a	way	that	circumvents	government	traffic	monitoring.		 	
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RESEARCH	METHODS	AND	PROCEDURES		Method				 The	overall	objective	of	this	study	is	to	determine	if	levels	of	Dark	Web	awareness	rise	when	levels	of	government	surveillance	awareness	rise.	I	am	hypothesizing	that	they	do,	so	as	a	person’s	awareness	of	government	surveillance	rises,	the	more	likely	they	are	to	have	some	sort	of	knowledge	about	the	Dark	Web.	It	stands	to	reason	that	a	person	aware	of	government	surveillance	would	want	to	take	steps	to	protect	their	information	and	identity	online,	and	thus	would	seek	out	tools	to	do	so.	Government	surveillance	has	become	such	an	ingrained	part	of	life	that	citizens	are	constantly	reminded	of.	Citizens	may	want	to	fight	back	and	do	something	to	protect	their	anonymity.	While	Tor	may	not	be	the	easiest	tool	to	seek	out,	it	is	one	of	the	more	effective	ones.	This	study	takes	the	form	of	a	questionnaire,	given	to	management	information	systems	students	at	the	University	of	Mississippi.	They	were	given	the	option	to	take	the	survey	in	class.			Instrument			 The	study	itself	is	in	two	parts.	The	first	part	is	based	on	a	survey	created	by	Dr.	Annie	I.	Anton	and	Dr.	Julia	B.	Earp	in	their	paper	“Examining	Internet	Privacy	Values	within	the	Context	of	User	Privacy	Values.”		The	survey	measures	attitudes	towards	various	issues	in	information	privacy	which	are	broken	down	into	six	factors:	personalization	(the	use	of	cookies	and	personally	identifying	information	(PII)	to	customize	advertisements	or	other	facets	of	users’	online	experience),	
	 27	
notice/awareness	(websites	making	users	aware	of	their	PII	being	used	in	different	ways),	transfer	(users’	PII	being	transferred	to	a	third	party),	collection	(different	sorts	of	information,	such	as	browser	configuration	or	information	about	browsing	habits	being	gathered),	information	storage	(unauthorized	personnel,	including	hackers,	gaining	access	to	a	user’s	information),	and	access/participation	(users	being	involved	in	the	process	of	their	PII	being	collected).		This	instrument	is	modeled	in	Figure	1.		Anton	and	Earp’s	six	independent	variables,	the	six	factors,			 Figure	1:	Anton	and	Earp’s	Instrument													directly	impact	the	dependent	variable,	attitudes	towards	information	privacy.		
Personalization	
N/A	
Transfer	
Collection	
Info	Storage	
A/P	
Privacy	attitudes	
	 28	
I	have	added	a	seventh	factor	into	the	study,	Dark	Web.		As	the	name	implies,	this	section	measures	Dark	Web	awareness	and	the	participant’s	intent	to	use	the	Dark	Web	in	the	future.	This	is	modeled	in	Figure	2.	The	six	independent	variables	are	joined	by	another	variable,	Dark	Web.	All	seven	of	these	independent	variables	affect	the	original	dependent	variable,	privacy	attitudes,	which	in	turn	impacts	a	new	dependent	variable,	Dark	Web	awareness.	Each	of	these	factors	is	further	broken	down	into	multiple	questions,	which	are	rated	by	the	participant	on	a	scale	of	how	much	the	participant	agrees	with	each	statement,	from	“strongly	agree”	to	“strongly	disagree.”	While	many			 Figure	2:	Anton	and	Earp’s	Instrument	With	the	Dark	Web	Variable												
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of	the	questions	in	Anton	and	Earp’s	survey	are	focused	on	examining	the	use	of	PII	by	marketers,	it	will	be	interesting	to	see	how	attitudes	towards	a	perceived	“good”	use	(customization	of	web	experience)	will	differ	from	a	perceived	“bad”	use	(government	surveillance),	even	though	both	involve	the	use	of	similar	information.	The	advantage	of	using	this	scale	over	others	is	that	participants	find	the	different	factors	relatable	(Preibusch	1141).	This	means	that	the	participants	will	have	more	knowledge	and	understanding	of	the	factors	and	will	hopefully	lead	to	more	accurate	answers.	This	is	the	main	reason	why	Anton	and	Earp’s	instrument’s	was	chosen	as	opposed	to	others;	the	current	study	is	founded	on	that	breaking	the	complex	privacy	issues	brought	upon	by	government	act	after	government	act	into	smaller,	more	relatable	pieces	will	result	in	the	respondents	truly	examining	their	own	values	and	attitudes	towards	information	privacy	and	thereby	yielding	more	accurate	data	for	analysis	in	this	study.	Anton	and	Earp	created	this	instrument	by	splitting	different	websites’	privacy	policies	into	smaller	phrases	to	analyze	trends	(Earp,	Anton,	Aiman-Smith,	and	Stufflebeam	229).	These	statements	were	then	placed	into	one	of	twelve	categories	dealing	with	information	privacy.	The	categories	were	consolidated	into	the	six	aforementioned	factors,	designed	specifically	to	“tap	into	the	user’s	value	in	terms	of	privacy	policies”	(Earp,	Anton,	Aiman-Smith,	and	Stufflebeam	231).		In	a	follow	up	paper,	“How	Internet	Users’	Privacy	Concerns	Have	Changed	Since	2002,”	Anton	and	Earp	noted	that	Internet	users	seemed	primarily	concerned	with	information	transfer,	notice/awareness,	and	information	storage,	which	are	also	of	primary	concern	in	the	current	study	(Anton,	Earp,	and	Young	1).	
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	 	 Figure	3:	Instrument	with	Optional	Unified	Theory	Section														 The	second	section	of	the	survey	is	taken	from	the	Unified	Theory	of	Acceptance	and	Usage	of	Technology,	developed	by	Viswanath	Venkatesh,	Michael	G.	Morris,	Gordon	B.	Davis,	and	Fred	D.	Davis	for	the	article	“User	Acceptance	of	Information	Technology:	Toward	a	Unified	View.”	This	specifically	measures	the	participants’	perceived	usefulness	and	intent	to	use	the	Dark	Web.	This	section	of	the	survey	is	only	accessible	to	those	who	indicate	that	they	have	previously	used	Tor	to	access	the	Dark	Web.		The	second	section	acts	as	a	moderator	to	the	Dark	Web	awareness	variable,	providing	more	insight	into	users’	perceived	value	of	the	Dark	Web	and	Tor,	as	shown	in	Figure	3.	These	results,	combined	with	the	results	
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from	the	first	part	of	the	survey,	should	provide	a	better	idea	of	how	information	security	awareness	impacts	Dark	Web	usage	and	awareness.		Figure	4:	Data	Model	Summary	Factor	1:	Personalization	 Personalization	deals	with	how	much	users	would	like	their	PII	to	be	used	customize	their	web	experience.	Factor	2:	Notice/Awareness	 Notice	and	awareness	deal	with	how	much	users	would	like	to	be	notified	that	their	PII	is	being	used.	Factor	3:	Transfer	 Transfer	deals	with	a	user	interest	in	who	their	PII	is	transferred	to	after	a	website	collects	it.	Factor	4:	Collection	 Collection	deals	with	the	kinds	of	information	that	are	collected	from	a	user	and	the	value	they	place	on	each	type.	Factor	5:	Information	Storage	 Information	storage	deals	with	the	user’s	interest	in	unauthorized	personnel	gaining	access	to	their	data.	Factor	6:	Access/Participation	 Access	and	participation	deal	with	the	user	being	involved	in	the	process	of	their	PII	being	collected.	Factor	7:	Dark	Web	 Dark	Web	deals	with	the	participant’s	knowledge	of	the	Dark	Web.	Unified	Theory	of	Acceptance	and	Usage	of	Technology	 When	the	participant	responds	that	they	have	used	Tor	to	access	the	Dark	Web,	they	are	taken	to	this	section	to	measure	their	attitudes	and	opinions	about	the	Dark	Web.		 	
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	 	 DATA	ANALYSIS	AND	RESEARCH	RESULTS		Anton	and	Earp’s	Seven	Factors		
	Figure	1.1		 Figure	1.1	shows	the	results	of	the	first	factor	of	the	survey,	personalization.	The	users	were	presented	a	series	of	statements	regarding	the	use	of	their	personally	identifying	information	(PII)	to	customize	what	they	see	online.	Across	the	board,	most	respondents	showed	some	level	of	concern	over	their	information	and	purchasing	habits	being	used	to	customize	their	web	experience.	The	first	statement	read	that	they	minded	their	PII	being	used	to	customize	their	browsing	experience,	to	which	29.87%	strongly	agreed.	The	second	statement	dealt	with	cookies,	to	which	32.47%	of	respondents	strongly	agreed	that	they	minded	cookies	on	their	computer.	The	third	statement	dealt	with	purchasing	history,	and	28.57%	strongly	agreed	that	they	minded	their	purchasing	history	being	used	to	customize	
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their	web	experience.	The	main	cause	of	concern	was	statement	four,	which	said	that	they	minded	their	PII	being	used	for	marketing	and	research	activities.	45.45%	responded	that	they	strongly	agreed.	Finally,	the	fifth	statement	said	that	the	respondents	minded	a	web	site	monitoring	their	purchasing	activities,	to	which	35.06%	strongly	agreed.	While	customization	of	web	experience	could	be	considered	a	positive	outcome	of	PII	or	purchasing	history	collection,	it	is	evident	that	most	respondents	are	still	wary	of	it,	with	few	disagreeing	with	the	statements	(and	in	the	case	of	question	two,	no	one	strongly	disagreeing).	
	Figure	1.2		 Figure	1.2	shows	the	results	of	the	second	factor	in	the	survey,	notice/awareness.	In	this	factor,	respondents	were	presented	with	statements	about	being	notified	that	their	PII	is	being	used	or	that	it	is	being	collected.	Notably,	two	of	the	statements	had	no	one	strongly	disagree	with	them,	and	statement	four	had	no	disagreement	at	all.	The	first	statement,	which	57.14%	strongly	agreed	with,	stated	that	the	respondents	wanted	the	option	to	decide	how	their	PII	is	used.	The	
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second	statement	stated	that	they	wanted	a	website	to	disclose	security	safeguards	in	place	to	protect	their	PII,	which	51.95%	strongly	agreed	with.	The	third	statement	dealt	with	websites	disclosing	how	their	PII	would	be	use,	which	59.74%	strongly	agreed	with.	The	fourth	statement,	which	had	the	highest	strongly	agree	percentage	at	61.04%,	stated	that	they	wanted	a	website	to	tell	them	when	the	website	would	use	their	PII	in	a	way	not	previously	disclosed.	Finally,	the	fifth	statement	said	that	the	respondents	wanted	to	be	informed	of	changes	to	a	website’s	privacy	practices,	which	59.74%	strongly	agreed	with.	Again,	as	with	factor	1,	most	of	the	responses	to	this	section	were	positive,	almost	overwhelmingly	so.		
	Figure	1.3		 Figure	1.3	shows	the	results	of	the	answers	from	the	third	factor,	transfer.	These	statements	were	about	the	respondents’	PII	and	purchasing	habits	being	transferred	from	the	website	that	collected	them	to	a	third	party.	The	first	statement	said	the	participants	minded	when	their	purchasing	habits	were	transferred	to	a	third	party,	which	gathered	a	53.25%	strongly	agree	response	rate.	The	second	
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statement,	which	dealt	with	their	“information”	in	a	general	sense	being	shared	with	third	parties,	had	58.44%	strongly	agree.	Finally,	the	third	statement	said	that	the	respondents	minded	when	their	PII	was	bought	by	or	traded	to	third	parties,	which	got	the	highest	strongly	agree	response	of	this	factor	at	66.23%.	Again,	the	responses	trended	mostly	positive,	with	only	a	small	portion	disagreeing	with	the	statements	each	time.	Interestingly	enough,	a	smaller	number	of	respondents	strongly	agreed	with	the	marketing	and	research	questions	in	Factor	1	than	they	did	for	the	first	question	in	this	section.	This	could	be	attributed	to	the	first	section	dealing	with	web	experience	customization,	a	potentially	positive	outcome	of	PII	sharing,	while	this	section	only	deals	with	it	in	vague	terms	of	sharing.	
	Factor	1.4		 Factor	1.4	contains	the	results	of	the	responses	to	the	fourth	factor,	collection.	In	this	portion,	respondents	were	provided	a	series	of	statements	about	the	kind	of	information	a	website	may	collect	from	a	user.	The	first	statement	said	that	the	participants	mind	when	a	website	gathers	(without	their	permission)	
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information	about	their	browsing	patterns.	This	garnered	a	53.25%	strongly	agree	response	rate.	The	second	statement,	which	dealt	with	a	website	gathering	information	about	the	user’s	browser	configuration,	gathered	a	54.55%	strongly	agree	response.	The	third	statement	said	the	users	minded	when	a	website	collected	their	IP	address	without	their	permission,	which	61.04%	strongly	agreed	with.	The	strongly	agree	responses	finally	dip	in	the	fourth	statement,	with	only	44.16%	strongly	agreeing	with	minding	a	website	collecting	information	about	the	computer	or	operating	system	they	are	using.	The	fifth	and	final	statement	said	the	respondents	minded	a	web	site	recording	the	previous	websites	that	they	had	been	to,	and	only	45.45%	of	participants	strongly	agreed	with	it.		The	strongly	agree	numbers	tended	to	trend	down	in	this	section,	as	more	responders	began	to	feel	neutral	about	the	statements.	Statement	four’s	neutrality	rate	was	20.78%.	This	may	be	because	websites	routinely	need	information	about	operating	system	or	browser	configuration	to	display	content	completely	and	accurately	(for	example,	a	website	showing	a	different	program	download	to	OSX	users	than	Windows	users).	Interestingly,	less	users	tended	to	agree	with	the	statement	from	factor	1	dealing	with	cookies,	another	accepted	part	of	internet	browsing	and	website	functionality.		
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	Figure	1.5		 Figure	1.5	shows	the	results	of	the	fifth	factor,	information	storage.	This	factor	contained	two	statements	about	who	is	actually	accessing	the	data	stored	by	websites.	The	first	statement	said	that	the	participant	was	concerned	with	unauthorized	employees	gaining	access	to	their	information,	which	64.94%	strongly	agreed	with.	The	second	statement	said	that	the	respondents	were	concerned	with	unauthorized	hackers	doing	the	same,	and	74.03%	strongly	agreed	with	that.	Almost	no	one	responded	negatively	to	either	statement.	These	are	very	easy	statements	to	agree	with,	as	both	are	genuine	concerns	over	data	privacy	and	safety.	
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	Factor	1.6		 Factor	1.6	contains	the	results	of	the	answers	to	the	third	factor	of	the	survey,	access/participation.	The	two	statements	in	this	factor	dealt	with	what	a	user	could	do	with	their	PII	after	a	website	has	captured	it.	The	first	statement	said	that	the	users	wanted	to	be	able	to	check	their	PII	for	accuracy,	which	42.86%	agreed	with.	The	second	and	final	statement	said	that	the	participants	wanted	to	be	able	to	modify	their	PII,	which	gathered	a	35.06%	strongly	agree	rate.		This	section	had	the	smallest	gap	between	strongly	agree	and	agree	of	any	of	the	original	six	factors.	It	is	also	the	only	factor	to	deal	with	how	a	user	interacts	with	their	data	after	it	is	collected,	which	may	explain	some	of	the	apathy	and	the	high	neutrality	rate.	Still,	barely	any	participants	disagreed	with	wanting	to	be	able	to	change	their	PII.				
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Factor	7:	Dark	Web		
	Figure	1.7		 Figure	1.7	contains	information	about	the	seventh	factor,	dark	web.	This	is	one	of	my	own	design	that	I	added	to	the	end	of	the	original	instrument.	Its	purpose	is	to	test	knowledge	of	the	dark	web,	and	the	responses	varied	greatly	from	the	rest	of	the	survey.	The	first	statement	succinctly	said	that	the	participant	was	knowledgeable	about	the	dark	web	and	its	uses.	Interestingly,	25.97%	agreed	with	the	statement	followed	by	23.38%	disagreeing.		The	second	statement	said	that	the	participant	has	accessed	the	Dark	Web	through	the	Tor	browser	at	some	point	in	the	past	or	will	in	the	future.	31.17%	neither	agreed	nor	disagreed	with	the	statement,	while	27.27%	disagreed	and	20.78%	strongly	disagreed.	The	final	statement	in	the	survey	and	this	factor	is	an	inverse	of	the	first	statement	in	this	factor.	It	states	that	the	participant	has	limited	knowledge	of	the	deep	web.	Strangely,	36.36%	actually	
0.00%	5.00%	
10.00%	15.00%	
20.00%	25.00%	
30.00%	35.00%	
40.00%	
1	 2	 3	
Factor	7:	Dark	Web	
Strongly	Agree	Agree	Neither	Agree	nor	Disagree	Disagree	Strongly	Disagree	
	 40	
agreed	with	this	statement	versus	the	23.38%	that	disagreed	with	being	knowledgeable.		Unified	Theory	of	Acceptance	and	Technology			 The	results	from	the	Unified	Theory	of	Acceptance	and	Usage	of	Technology	(included	in	Appendix	#1)	sheds	some	light	how	the	respondents	that	answered	that	they	had	used	Tor	for	browsing	the	Dark	Web.	While	negative	response	rates	for	every	statement	were	low,	of	note	is	statement	9,	“using	the	system	is	a	bad	idea.”	54.55%	neither	agreed	nor	disagreed	with	the	statement,	meaning	that,	overall,	most	respondents	that	had	used	Tor	to	access	the	Dark	Web	did	not	assign	a	moral	value	to	it.	The	same	amount	neither	agreed	nor	disagreed	with	the	statement	that	Tor	was	fun.	The	statement	“I	am	apprehensive	about	using	the	system”	actually	garnered	the	most	respondents	strongly	disagreeing,	with	18.18%,	but	a	high	number	also	agreed,	with	45.45%	responding	that	they	agreed	in	some	capacity.	Even	Tor	users	(frequent	and	infrequent)	view	Tor	and	the	Dark	Web	as	something	that	might	not	be	the	best	idea.	There	could	be	many	reasons	for	this,	from	media	stereotyping	to	the	users	potentially	seeing	something	illicit	while	using	the	Dark	Web.						
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				Analysis		
	Figure	2.1		 Overall,	45.45%	either	agreed	or	strongly	agreed	that	they	had	knowledge	of	the	Dark	Web	and	its	uses	but	only	20.78%	agreed	that	they	had	used	it	or	would	use	it	in	the	future.	The	objective	of	this	study	was	to	determine	if	an	increase	in	privacy	concern	would	lead	to	an	increase	in	attitudes	regarding	the	Dark	Web.	One	way	to	determine	this	is	correlation,	which	examines	how	two	variables	move	in	tandem.	A	score	of	1	is	perfect	positive	correlation,	meaning	that	as	one	variable	increases	the	other	variable	always	increases	with	it.	Likewise,	a	score	of	-1	is	perfect	negative	correlation,	meaning	that	as	one	variable	increases,	the	other	
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always	decreases.	In	this	case,	the	independent	variable	is	any	one	of	the	questions	about	privacy	(taken	separately)	and	the	dependent	variable	is	Dark	Web	knowledge.		 Figure	2.1	contains	the	correlation	results	for	statement	23,	“I	am	knowledgeable	about	the	Dark	Web	and	its	uses.”	The	highest	variable	positively	correlated	with	this	statement	is	statement	18,	“I	mind	when	a	website	records	the	previous	website	I	visited”	with	0.22	correlation.	Other	highly	positively	correlated	variables	include	statement	3,	“I	mind	when	a	website	uses	cookies	to	customize	my	browsing	experience”	(0.19)	and	statement	5,	“I	mind	when	a	website	monitors	my	purchasing	patterns”	(0.20).	A	few	statements	dip	into	negative	correlation,	the	lowest	of	which	being	statement	12,	“I	mind	when	my	information	is	shared	with	third	parties”	(-0.067).	There	is	not	much	information	to	glean	from	this;	the	three	highest	positively	correlating	statements	do	not	have	a	trend	running	through	them	(besides	the	first	and	the	last	both	dealing	with	internet	browsing	habits,	albeit	tangentially	on	the	last)	and	they	are	not	highly	positively	correlated	with	the	dependent	variable.	This	implicitly	means	that	an	increase	in	attitudes	towards	Internet	privacy	does	not	lead	to	an	increase	in	Dark	Web	knowledge.	The	two	variables	do	not	have	much	positive	impact	on	each	other	and	at	worst	they	are	negatively	correlated.		 The	second	method	of	analysis	chosen	was	the	t-test,	which	examines	two	groups	to	see	if	they	are	statistically	different	from	each	other.	It	compares	the	means	of	both	groups	to	see	how	similar	they	are,	which	goes	to	show	how	much	overlap	there	is	in	each	section.	I	wanted	to	test	each	variable	individually	against	
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Factor	7,	“I	am	knowledgeable	about	the	Dark	Web	and	its	uses.”	To	do	this,	I	selected	the	first	question	of	each	factor	to	use	as	the	first	group	(as	the	first	question	was	generally	the	most	explanatory	for	the	entire	factor)	and	used	the	first	question	of	Factor	7	as	the	second	group.	In	this	case,	the	null	hypothesis	is	that	the	two	variables	measured	in	the	test	have	no	relationship	to	each	other.	I	used	the	standard	alpha	of	0.05	for	all	of	the	tests.		
t-Test:	Two-Sample	Assuming	Unequal	Variances	
	   
		
Variable	
1	
Variable	
2	
Mean	 2.350649	 2.792208	
Variance	 1.467532	 1.666781	
Observations	 77	 77	
Hypothesized	Mean	
Difference	 0	
	df	 151	
	t	Stat	 -2.18858	
	P(T<=t)	one-tail	 0.015082	
	t	Critical	one-tail	 1.655007	
	P(T<=t)	two-tail	 0.030164	
	t	Critical	two-tail	 1.975799	 		Figure	3.1			 Figure	3.1	shows	the	first	question	of	Factor	7	tested	against	the	first	question	of	Factor	1,	“I	mind	when	a	website	uses	my	PII	to	customize	my	browsing	experience.”	The	alpha	of	these	results,	0.030164,	is	less	than	the	alpha	used	to	conduct	the	test,	0.05,	the	null	hypothesis	is	rejected,	meaning	that	the	two	variables	have	a	statistically	significant	relationship.		
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t-Test:	Two-Sample	Assuming	Unequal	Variances	
	   
		
Variable	
1	
Variable	
2	
Mean	 1.506494	 2.792208	
Variance	 0.411141	 1.666781	
Observations	 77	 77	
Hypothesized	Mean	
Difference	 0	
	df	 111	
	t	Stat	 -7.82664	
	P(T<=t)	one-tail	 1.6E-12	
	t	Critical	one-tail	 1.658697	
	P(T<=t)	two-tail	 3.19E-12	
	t	Critical	two-tail	 1.981567	 		Figure	3.2			 Figure	3.2	shows	the	first	question	of	Factor	7	tested	against	the	first	question	of	Factor	2,	“I	want	the	option	to	decide	how	my	PII	is	used.”	Again,	the	variables	are	statistically	significant,	as	the	alpha	is	far	less	than	0.05.		
		
Variable	
1	
Variable	
2	
Mean	 1.844156	 2.792208	
Variance	 1.291183	 1.666781	
Observations	 77	 77	
Hypothesized	Mean	
Difference	 0	
	df	 150	
	t	Stat	 -4.83706	
	P(T<=t)	one-tail	 1.62E-06	
	t	Critical	one-tail	 1.655076	
	P(T<=t)	two-tail	 3.24E-06	
	t	Critical	two-tail	 1.975905	 		Figure	3.3	
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	 Figure	3.3	shows	the	first	question	of	Factor	7	tested	against	the	first	question	of	Factor	3,	“I	mind	when	a	website	discloses	my	buying	patterns	to	third	parties.”	Again,	the	alpha	value	of	the	results	is	much	lower	than	the	alpha	used	to	conduct	the	test,	so	we	can	reject	the	null	hypothesis.			
t-Test:	Two-Sample	Assuming	Unequal	Variances	
	   
		
Variable	
1	
Variable	
2	
Mean	 1.831169	 2.792208	
Variance	 1.273753	 1.666781	
Observations	 77	 77	
Hypothesized	Mean	
Difference	 0	
	df	 149	
	t	Stat	 -4.91783	
	P(T<=t)	one-tail	 1.14E-06	
	t	Critical	one-tail	 1.655145	
	P(T<=t)	two-tail	 2.29E-06	
	t	Critical	two-tail	 1.976013	 		Figure	3.4				 Figure	3.4	shows	the	results	of	the	testing	done	on	the	fourth	factor.	Once	again,	the	alpha	is	less	than	0.05,	so	we	can	reject	the	null	hypothesis.							
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t-Test:	Two-Sample	Assuming	Unequal	Variances	
	   
		
Variable	
1	
Variable	
2	
Mean	 1.454545	 2.792208	
Variance	 0.488038	 1.666781	
Observations	 77	 77	
Hypothesized	Mean	
Difference	 0	
	df	 117	
	t	Stat	 -7.99625	
	P(T<=t)	one-tail	 5.11E-13	
	t	Critical	one-tail	 1.657982	
	P(T<=t)	two-tail	 1.02E-12	
	t	Critical	two-tail	 1.980448	 		Figure	3.5		 Figure	3.5	shows	the	first	question	of	Factor	5	tested	against	the	first	question	of	Factor	7.	Once	again,	the	alpha	is	lower	than	0.05,	so	we	can	reject	the	null	hypothesis		
t-Test:	Two-Sample	Assuming	Unequal	Variances	
	   
		
Variable	
1	
Variable	
2	
Mean	 1.454545	 2.792208	
Variance	 0.488038	 1.666781	
Observations	 77	 77	
Hypothesized	Mean	
Difference	 0	
	df	 117	
	t	Stat	 -7.99625	
	P(T<=t)	one-tail	 5.11E-13	
	t	Critical	one-tail	 1.657982	
	P(T<=t)	two-tail	 1.02E-12	
	t	Critical	two-tail	 1.980448	 		Figure	3.6		
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	 Figure	3.6	holds	the	results	for	the	final	test	in	which	the	first	question	of	Factor	6	was	tested	against	the	first	question	in	Factor	7.	Once	again,	we	cannot	reject	the	null	hypothesis.			Suggestions	for	improvement			 The	statements	regarding	privacy	in	the	first	section	of	the	survey	are	very	broad	and	easy	to	agree	with.	For	example,	most	Internet	users	are	probably	worried	about	hackers	on	some	sort	of	broad	level	or	most	users	would	like	to	be	notified	when	their	PII	is	being	used	in	ways	they	had	not	previously	agreed	to.	The	fact	that	several	early	questions	(especially	in	factor	4)	had	little	to	no	disagreement	proves	this.	These	broad,	generally	agreeable	statements	may	not	have	probed	deep	enough	to	prove	any	sort	of	deeper	investment	into	privacy	issues	and	therefore	agreeing	with	them	does	not	prove	that	the	respondents	would	seek	out	ways	to	remedy	their	fears.	Using	more	pointed,	direct	statements	may	be	more	effective.	PII	is	also	a	broad	term	that	could	potentially	have	a	connotation	from	person	to	person,	which	could	also	skew	the	results.	Finally,	this	study	was	also	done	exclusively	with	management	information	systems	students.	Perhaps	widening	the	scope	to	those	outside	of	college	as	well	could	provide	more	enlightening	answers.			 	
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CONCLUSION			 Tor	and	the	Dark	Web	are	tools	to	circumvent	government	surveillance	and	prying	eyes.	They	exist	to	maintain	anonymity	on	the	Internet	and	could	be	considered	a	form	of	peaceful,	civil	disobedience	(depending	on	what	that	communication	is	used	for).	Findings	from	the	research	conducted	suggest	that	concern	with	internet	privacy	issues	and	the	use	of	personally	identifying	information	by	websites	and	third	parties	is	not	correlated	to	dark	web	knowledge	or	usage.	Most	respondents	agreed	or	strongly	agreed	with	the	statements	regarding	privacy	but	those	concerns	did	not	translate	to	a	need	or	want	to	circumvent	them	with	Tor.		 Why	could	that	be?	45.45%	of	respondents	that	used	Tor	at	all	said	that	they	were	apprehensive	about	using	the	system,	even	though	responses	to	other	questions	indicate	positive	attitudes	towards	using	Tor.	It	stands	to	reason	that	the	number	of	those	that	are	apprehensive	about	Tor	that	have	never	touched	it	could	be	higher.	Could	it	be	the	social	stigma?	The	term	“Dark	Web”	is	generally	associated	with	buying	drugs	on	the	internet	or	viewing	illicit	pornography,	two	acts	that	most	people	do	not	want	to	be	associated	with.	Or	could	it	perhaps	be	that	they	are	frightened	of	being	put	on	the	ever	present	“watch	list”	that	the	government	holds?	Regardless	of	the	reason,	my	hypothesis	that	a	higher	concern	with	Internet	privacy	leads	to	higher	Dark	Web	awareness	is	incorrect.	However,	each	of	the	representative	questions	for	the	factors	were	statistically	significant	in	some	way.	Taken	individually,	each	of	the	factors	seems	to	have	some	sort	of	an	effect	on	Dark	
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Web	knowledge,	but	across	the	board	they	aren’t	correlated.	It	is	possible	that	the	impact	that	each	of	the	variables	has	on	Dark	Web	awareness	is	small,	albeit	significant,	meaning	that	my	hypothesis	is	indeed	correct,	but	a	simple	glance	at	the	numbers	seems	to	prove	that	wrong.	All	that	was	tested	for	is	that	the	variables	were	statistically	significant	in	their	impact,	not	that	the	impact	was	positive	or	negative.	Even	though	I	was	wrong,	this	leads	to	even	more	questions	and	more	opportunities	for	research.	Could	it	be	that	Tor	is	just	too	much	for	the	average	user?	Has	the	media	stigmatized	it	too	much?	It	is	very	interesting	that	concerns	with	Internet	privacy	do	not	lead	to	a	need	to	circumvent	it.	Perhaps	some	citizens	have	just	given	in	and	felt	like	there	is	nothing	they	can	do	to	protect	themselves.		Limitations				 This	research	was	subject	to	limitations.	The	first	limitation	of	this	project	was	the	demographic.	While	the	sample	size	of	79	is	reasonable,	the	study	was	only	conducted	with	management	information	systems	students,	most	above	the	age	of	20	and	below	30.	While	opening	the	demographics	up	to	people	out	of	college	may	just	make	the	variables	even	less	correlated,	it	could	also	provide	a	more	true	to	life	picture.			 In	addition,	the	thesis	was	limited	by	the	instrument	chosen.	While	the	instrument	provided	valuable	insight	into	attitudes	regarding	internet	privacy	issues,	it	contains	questions	about	marketing	research	and	other	topics	that	are	
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slightly	outside	the	scope	of	the	study.	The	original	instrument	was	created	by	examining	health	care	websites’	privacy	policies.	That	may	give	some	insight	into	the	kinds	of	privacy	invasions	that	people	agree	to,	but	does	not	exactly	fit	the	standards	of	government	surveillance.		While	those	attitudes	are	included	within	the	broad	umbrella	of	“privacy	issues,”	they	may	be	a	little	too	broad	to	lead	to	the	expectation	that	the	respondents	would	use	Tor;	that	is	to	say,	just	because	you	are	concerned	that	Facebook	is	changing	its	ads	to	reflect	what	you	have	looked	at	on	Amazon,	that	does	not	mean	you	are	going	to	seek	out	Tor.	Many	of	the	issues	brought	up	by	the	statements	have	solutions	outside	of	accessing	a	new	network,	such	as	ad	blocker	software	or	browser	extensions	like	NoScript.	The	Dark	Web	factor	may	have	also	been	not	extensive	enough	to	really	grasp	the	question	of	“why,”	even	though	that	was	not	necessarily	a	part	of	the	hypothesis.	Even	the	nature	of	a	survey	itself	(given	in	class,	no	less)	lends	itself	to	potentially	less	than	honest	answers.			Further	Research			 For	further	research,	I	would	first	suggest	expanding	the	scope	of	the	research	to	include	those	out	of	college.	If	the	focus	remains	people	who	are	computer	savvy	(as	is	the	assumption	when	dealing	with	management	information	systems	students),	possibly	expand	it	out	to	IT	professionals.	I	would	also	recommend	expanding	the	instrument	to	include	more	questions	about	specific	
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government	surveillance,	possibly	in	an	entirely	new	factor,	and	expanding	the	Dark	Web	section	to	include	some	of	the	ideas	from	the	Unified	Theory.										 	
	 52	
	 REFERENCES	Raine,	Lee,	and	D’vera		Cohn.	“Cenus:	Computer	ownership,	Internet	connection		varies	widely	across	U.S.”	Pew	Research	Center.	14	Sept.	2014.	17	March	2015.		United	States.	Select	Committee	to	Study	Government	Operations.	Supplementary	
Detailed	Staff	Reports	of	Intelligence	Activities	and	the	Rights	of	Americans.		Washington:	GPO.	Web.	18	March	2015.	<http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book3/html/	ChurchB3_0001a.htm>.		Monnat,	Daniel	E.,	and		Anne	L	.Ethen.	“A	Primer	on	the	Federal	Wiretap	Act	and	Its		Fourth	Amendment	Framework.”	Kansas	Trial	Lawyers	Association	Journal	March	(2004):	12-15.	Web.	18	March	2015.	<http://www.monnat.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/Wiretap.pdf>.		Foreign	Intelligence	Surveillance	Act	of	1978.		Pub.	L.	95-511.	92	Stat	1783.	25		October	1978.	Web.	20	March	2015.	<	http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/	STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf>.		Swire,	Peter.		“The	System	of	Foreign	Intelligence	Surveillance	Law.”	George		
Washington	Law	Review.	72	(2004):	1-104.	Web.	20	March	2015.			USA	PATRIOT	Act.	Pub.	L.	107-56.	115	Stat	272.	26	October	2001.	Web.	1	April	2015.		<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/	STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf>.		Podgor,	Ellen	S.	“Computer	Crimes	and	the	USA	PATRIOT	Act.”	Criminal	Justice		
Magazine	17.2	(2002).	Web.	2	April	2015.	<http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_magazine_home/crimjust_cjmag_17_2_crimes.html>.	
	“Clearing	Up	Confusion	–	Deep	Web	Vs.	Dark	Web.”		Brightplanet.	n.p.	27	March		2014.	Web.	15	April	2015.	<http://www.brightplanet.com/2014/03/clearing-confusion-deep-web-vs-dark-web/>.		Leger,	Donna	Leinwand.	“FBI	Cracks	Silk	Road.”		USA	Today	15	May	2014.	Web.	15		April	2015.	<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/21/fbi-cracks-silk-road/2984921/>.		
Tor:	Overview.	Tor	Project.	n.d.	Web.	16	April	2015.		
	 53	
<https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en>.		
Tor	Users.	Tor	Project.	n.d.	Web.	16	April	2015.		<https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en>.		
Abuse	FAQ.	Tor	Project.	n.d.	Web.	16	April	2015.			<https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse.html.en>.		
Tor	FAQ.	Tor	Project.	n.d.	Web.	16	April	2015.			<https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en>.		Dierks,	T.	and	E.	Rescorla.	“The	Transport	Layer	Security	(TLS)	Protocol	Version		1.2.”	Internet	Engineering	Task	Force.	August	2008.	Web.	20	April	2015.	<http://tools.ietf.org/html/r	fc5246?as_url_id=AAAAAAVBehpzRqATU5xWpMSTPjTY4oV6aOnai43OyHdsdcjqdSlYu0y-i_wtuyMcDhdfR_le_fBCnWW1xu50YwXZ7oot>.		Kirkpatrick	and	Lockhart	LLP.	“The	Homeland	Security	Act	of	2002	–	A	Summary.”		
Homeland	Security	Bulletin.	March	2003.	Web.	20	April	2015.	<http://www.martindale.com/matter/asr-8824.pdf>.	
	Homeland	Security	Act	of	2002.	Pub.	L.	107-296.	116	Stat	2135.	25	November	2002.		Web.	25	April	2015.	<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf>.		“Let	the	Sun	Set	on	PATRIOT:	Section	212	and	Homeland	Security	Act	Section	225:		‘Emergency	Disclosure	of	Electronic	Communications	to	Protect	Life	and	Limb.”	Electronic	Frontier	Foundation.	n.d.	Web.	25	April	2015.	<https://w2.eff.org/patriot/sunset/212.php>.		Dingledine,	Roger,	Nick	Mathewson,	and	Paul	Syverson.	“Tor:	The	Second-	Generation	Onion	Router.”	Tor	Project.	n.d.	Web.	25	April	2015.	<https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf>.		
Fahrenheit	9/11.	Dir.	Michael	Moore.	Lionsgate	Films,	2004.			Earp,	J.B.;	Anton,	A.I.;	Aiman-Smith,	L.;	Stufflebeam,	W.H.	“Examining	Internet		privacy	values	within	the	context	of	user	privacy	values.”	IEEE	Transactions	on	Engineering	Management.	2005.	6	December	2015.	<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.umiss.idm.oclc.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1424412>.		Anton,	Annie	I.;	Earp,	Julie	B.;	Young,	Jessica	D.	“How	Internet	Users’	Privacy		Concerns	Have	Evolved	Since	2002.”	IEEE	Security	and	Privacy.	29	July	2009.	6	December	2015.	<http://theprivacyplace.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/tr_2009_16.pdf>.	
	 54	
	Preibusch,	Soren.	“Guide	to	measuring	privacy	concern:	Review	of	survey	and		observational	instruments.”	Int.	J.	Human-Computer	Studies.	71	(2013)	113-1143.	15	September	2015.		Venkatesh,	Viswanath,	Micheal	G.	Morris,	Gordon	B.	Davis,	and	Fred	D.	Davis.	“User		Acceptance	of	Technology:	Towards	a	Unified	View.”	MIS	Quarterly.	September	2003.	6	December	2015.	<	http://nwresearch.wikispaces.com/file/view/Venkatesh+User+Acceptance+of+Information+Technology+2003.pdf>.		 	
	 55	
APPENDIX	1:	INSTRUMENT	Factor	1:	Personalization	1. I	mind	when	a	website	uses	my	personally	identifying	information	(PII)	to	customize	my	browsing	experience.	2. I	mind	when	a	website	uses	cookies	to	customize	my	browsing	experience	(A	cookie	is	information	that	a	website	puts	on	your	hard	disk	so	it	can	remember	something	about	you	at	a	later	time).	3. I	mind	when	a	website	uses	my	purchasing	history	to	personalize	my	browsing	experience	(e.g.	by	suggesting	products	for	me	to	purchase).	4. I	mind	when	my	PII	is	used	for	marketing	or	research	activities.	5. I	mind	when	a	Web	site	monitors	my	purchasing	patterns.		Factor	2:	Notice/Awareness	1. I	want	the	option	to	decide	how	my	PII	is	used.	2. I	want	a	Web	site	to	disclose	security	safeguards	used	to	protect	my	PII.	3. I	want	a	Web	site	to	disclose	how	my	PII	will	be	used.		4. I	want	a	Web	site	to	inform	me	before	using	my	PII	in	a	manner	that	it	had	not	previously	disclosed	to	me.	5. I	want	a	Web	site	to	keep	me	informed	of	changes	to	its	privacy	practices.		Factor	3:	Transfer	1. I	mind	when	a	Web	site	discloses	my	buying	patterns	to	third	parties.	2. I	mind	when	my	information	is	shared	with	third	parties.	3. I	mind	when	my	PII	is	traded	with	or	sold	to	third	parties.		Factor	4:	Collection	1. I	mind	when	a	Web	site	that	I	visit	collects	(without	my	consent)	information	about	my	browsing	patterns.	2. I	mind	when	a	Web	site	that	I	visit	collects	(without	my	consent)	information	about	my	browser	configuration	3. I	mind	when	a	Web	site	that	I	visit	collects	(without	my	consent)	information	about	my	IP	address	(a	number	that	identifies	you	computer	from	all	other	computers	on	the	Internet).	4. I	mind	when	a	Web	site	that	I	visit	collects	(without	my	consent)	information	about	the	type	of	computer/operating	system	I	use.	5. I	mind	when	a	Web	site	records	the	previous	Web	site	I	visited.		Factor	5:	Information	Storage	1. I	am	concerned	about	unauthorized	employees	getting	access	to	my	information.	2. I	am	concerned	about	unauthorized	hackers	getting	access	to	my	information.		Factor	6:	Access/Participation	1. I	want	a	Web	site	to	allow	me	to	check	my	PII	for	accuracy.	
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2. I	want	a	Web	site	to	allow	me	to	modify	my	PII.		Factor	7:	Dark	Web	1. I	am	knowledgeable	about	the	Dark	Web	and	its	uses.	2. I	plan	on	accessing	the	Dark	Web	through	the	TOR	network	in	the	future	or	have	in	the	past.	3. My	knowledge	of	the	Dark	Web	is	limited.		
